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Abstract 
The companion piece to this article, “Situating Moral Justification,” challenges the idea that moral 
epistemology's mission is to establish a single, all-purpose reasoning strategy for moral justification 
because no reasoning practice can be expected to deliver authoritative moral conclusions in all social 
contexts. The present article argues that rethinking the mission of moral epistemology requires 
rethinking its method as well. Philosophers cannot learn which reasoning practices are suitable to use in 
particular contexts exclusively by exploring logical relations among concepts. Instead, in order to 
understand which reasoning practices are capable of justifying moral claims in different types of 
contexts, we need to study empirically the relationships between reasoning practices and the contexts 
in which they are used. The article proposes that philosophers investigate case studies of real-world 
moral disputes in which people lack shared cultural assumptions and/or are unequal in social power. It 
motivates and explains the proposed case study method and illustrates the philosophical value of this 
method through a case study. 
1. Introduction 
Moral disagreement among people who are culturally or religiously diverse, or who stand to each other 
in relations of social inequality, is often intractable. People from widely diverse backgrounds often lack 
enough shared values or assumptions to establish intelligible communication, and social inequality 
among people makes domination and repression all too easy, even for the well‐intentioned. We are 
interested in understanding how people can rationally resolve moral disagreements in situations where 
finding shared assumptions may be strained, or when parties to a dispute are unequal in social power 
and vulnerability. In this article, we prepare the ground for answering this urgent practical question by 
articulating and defending a method for doing moral epistemology designed to improve philosophical 
understanding of moral justification under conditions of diversity and inequality. 
Much existing philosophical work on moral justification occurs at a very high level of abstraction and 
sets quite bold theoretical goals. Many philosophers have assumed that moral justification can be pared 
down to a single reasoning practice or set of practices, which can be used to justify moral claims in any 
context. They therefore take the mission of moral epistemology to be the discovery or construction of a 
single, multipurpose model of moral reasoning. Philosophers have typically pursued this mission using 
“armchair” philosophical methods. They imagine what moral reasoning should be like either by 
constructing fictitious models of justification or by conceptualizing the logical constraints of moral 
reasoning under ideal conditions. In our view, the fruits of this philosophical labor as well as this way of 
laboring—that is, of doing moral epistemology—are inadequate for understanding how justified moral 
claims can be established in situations marked by cultural diversity and power inequality. 
An analogy between medical research and moral epistemology is instructive here to introduce our point. 
A drug tested successfully within the controlled conditions of a clinical trial may or may not achieve the 
expected health outcome when used in the real world. In the context of real life, it might even prove 
harmful, depending on how well or poorly the conditions of real life approximate the conditions of the 
trial. However, “the” conditions of real life vary considerably. Clinical trials conducted in the 1990s in the 
United States of the HIV drug AZT delivered very promising results in that context, but this same drug 
regimen proved ineffective and potentially harmful when introduced to populations in sub‐Saharan 
Africa that were struggling with epidemic levels of dehydration, malaria, and malnutrition, as well as a 
lack of sufficient health care infrastructure to support the complicated AZT regimen. There are enough 
physiological similarities among human beings to predict that when human beings are similarly situated 
they are likely to respond similarly to a given medical intervention; however, we are not all similarly 
situated. The controlled features of the clinical trial in the United States were designed for a population 
situated very differently from many populations in sub‐Saharan Africa, rendering the results of the U.S. 
trial inapplicable in the African context. 
Similarly, a model of moral justification developed under the controlled conditions of the philosopher's 
imagination and relying on his or her acknowledged or unacknowledged assumptions may or may not be 
capable of justifying moral claims under the conditions of real life. This may be not because the model 
has been applied incorrectly or unfairly but because it has been developed assuming a context with one 
set of features and then prescribed for all contexts, some of which have features that do not come close 
to approximating the features assumed in the philosopher's imagination. For example, the controlled 
conditions of philosophical imagination have tended to assume conditions in which interlocutors 
exchanging reasons have equal social power, and so philosophers have developed models of moral 
justification based on this assumption. These models may work well in situations where people are 
social equals, just as the AZT drug regimen worked well in populations who had adequate infrastructure 
and their basic health needs met. Yet a model of moral justification designed for conditions of social 
equality may be ineffective in situations where people have unequal social power, and may even be 
harmful if the model obscures power dynamics operative in that context or makes it too easy to 
rationalize power abuse. If the conditions of the real world diverge too much from the conditions of the 
philosopher's imagination, then prescribing a particular model of justification for real‐world conditions 
may be like prescribing the AZT drug regimen in sub‐Saharan contexts—both ineffective and potentially 
harmful. 
The analogy between clinical research and research in moral epistemology is admittedly imperfect, but 
it is good enough to extract the point we wish to make: in order to develop appropriate medical 
interventions for specific types of contexts, clinical researchers have to examine carefully the 
relationship between drug protocols and the context in which they are to be used. Researchers cannot 
know whether a particular drug will be effective or harmful in a particular context without careful 
attention to the interaction between the two, because certain features of the context, including social, 
environmental, and cultural factors, partially determine which drug protocol is likely to be effective. 
Similarly, we suggest that justifying moral claims involves a relationship between a reasoning practice 
and the context in which it is used. Philosophers cannot know which practices are fitting to use in which 
types of situation without carefully studying the relationship between reasoning practices and their 
contexts of use, since certain features of a context partially determine which reasoning practices are 
capable of justifying moral claims in that context.  
These considerations suggest two points about moral epistemology. First, and as we argue in the 
companion piece to this article, “Situating Moral Justification,” we think that moral epistemology should 
adopt a more modest mission. Rather than searching for the single, multipurpose model of reasoning 
capable of justifying moral claims in all contexts, our mission instead should be to seek guidelines 
enabling reasoners to select reasoning practices likely to be effective in particular types of situations. 
Second, we think the study of moral justification needs to be much more empirically grounded. In order 
to understand which reasoning practices are capable of justifying moral claims in different types of 
contexts, we need to study empirically the relationships between reasoning practices and the contexts 
in which they work well. 
Like a number of other contemporary philosophers, we advocate a methodological turn in moral and 
political philosophy, including moral epistemology, toward more empirically informed philosophical 
research. This turn is often called a move toward naturalizing epistemology and methodology because 
philosophers are attempting to make their research more continuous with results from empirical 
science. Some philosophers are using empirical findings from other disciplines, whereas other 
philosophers are attempting to conduct their own empirical research. Our proposal shares in the 
naturalizing spirit of these developments, but it suggests a new and distinct method for doing 
empirically grounded—naturalized—moral epistemology. 
Specifically, we propose that philosophers investigate case studies of real‐world moral disputes in which 
people lack shared cultural assumptions and/or are unequal in social power. Case studies always focus 
on what is being studied in relation to its environment, which makes this a promising method for 
investigating relationships between reasoning practices and their contexts of use. When investigating a 
case study, philosophers identify and explain the reasoning people are actually using in their particular 
attempts to justify a moral claim, and evaluate whether or not those reasoning practices are likely to 
facilitate or undermine moral justification in that case. We argue that working through case studies 
enables philosophers to understand better the obstacles to achieving moral justification that diversity 
and social power inequality actually pose, as opposed to the obstacles philosophers imagine they pose. 
Focusing on case studies may also enable philosophers to identify reasoning practices that actually work 
to mitigate the disruptive impact of these obstacles in certain cases, rather than the practices 
philosophers imagine to work.  
This article motivates and explains our proposed case study method in moral epistemology and goes on 
to defend and illustrate the philosophical value of this method. Section 2 motivates our proposal for 
using case studies in moral epistemology, making reference to our critical work in the first of these 
companion articles. In section 3, we explain what a case study is and our proposal for how to use this 
method in moral epistemology. The remainder of the article defends and illustrates our proposal by 
sharing one of our case studies, demonstrating how we analyze and assess it. 
2. Why Do We Need a New Method for Doing Moral Epistemology? 
In “Situating Moral Justification” we challenged the idea that moral epistemology's mission is to 
establish a single, all‐purpose reasoning strategy for moral justification, and we illustrated this claim 
through a critical assessment of discourse ethics. We argued that using the reasoning recommended by 
discourse ethics is not rational in all circumstances. Specifically, we argued that it is unlikely to be 
rational in situations marked by cultural diversity and social inequality because the reasoning strategy is 
too susceptible to misuse by those with more social power. We used the example of discourse ethics to 
support our larger point, which is that no reasoning practice can be assumed to deliver authoritative 
moral conclusions independently of the social context in which it is used. 
In our view, most philosophers have underestimated the challenges that diversity and inequality can 
pose to achieving moral justification in real‐world settings. To be minimally acceptable, a reasoning 
practice must be plausible to and usable by moral agents in the case at hand, nonabusive of social 
power or vulnerability, and capable of delivering feasible conclusions. We take these conditions partially 
to define a perspective from which to validate moral claims in the types of contexts with which we are 
concerned. They provide some initial, broadly normative constraints on reasoning strategies that may 
count as minimally acceptable, and they guide our evaluation of reasoning practices in the real‐world 
cases of moral argumentation that we study. We contend, however, that what it means to satisfy these 
conditions will depend on the situation in which the occasion for moral justification arises. The 
situational features that influence whether and how a reasoning practice will satisfy these adequacy 
conditions include the social relations of power and vulnerability among moral interlocutors in particular 
situations of dispute, as well as the particular moral vocabularies and styles of reasoning that are 
available, meaningful, and usable to and by various parties. 
Taking seriously the view that moral justification always requires situated, social reasoning practices 
suggests the need for a new mission for the part of moral epistemology that studies moral justification. 
The mission can no longer be to establish a single reasoning practice or set of practices for use in any 
and all situations. This mission might be suitable for a world in which diversity and inequality were not 
ubiquitous, but this is not our world. In our world, to prescribe for all contexts a single practice of 
justification that has been developed under the controlled conditions of the philosopher's imagination 
may at best be ineffective and at worst harmful (potentially reinforcing or rationalizing power abuse) in 
situations that do not match these conditions. 
Rethinking the mission of moral epistemology requires rethinking its method as well. Philosophers 
cannot understand which reasoning practices are suitable to use in which contexts exclusively by 
imagining or exploring logical relations among concepts. Instead, in order to understand which 
reasoning practices and argumentative strategies are capable of justifying moral claims in different types 
of contexts, we need to study empirically the relationships between reasoning practices and the 
contexts in which they are used. 
We propose that philosophers investigate case studies of real‐world moral disputes in which people lack 
shared cultural assumptions and/or are unequal in social power. A case study model of naturalizing is 
particularly well suited for the conception of moral justification we defend as a situated social practice. 
Through investigating case studies, philosophers can scrutinize the details of particular situations in 
order to discern which social variables are salient in given cases, and examine how those variables 
operate either to support or undermine reasoning that is plausible, usable, power sensitive, and capable 
of delivering feasible conclusions. 
3. A Case Study Method for Doing Moral Epistemology 
A case study is a detailed investigation of an instance of something in a specific context. Case studies 
always focus on understanding what is being studied in relation to its environment or context (Flyvbjerg 
2011, 301). Also inherent in the idea of a case study is the idea that it represents some wider class of 
cases, so cases are investigated not simply in their unique particularity but with the thought that 
studying them will shed light on other cases.  
In our case studies, we begin by identifying a particular instance of a practice of moral justification that 
people are using in an attempt to justify a substantive moral claim about an issue that is under dispute. 
We try to specify the practice of moral justification that the instance exemplifies by identifying central 
assumptions people are relying on and their implicit norms of reasoning. We analyze each instance of 
justification by modeling how it delineates moral domain, characterizes moral agency, specifies 
reasoning strategies, and prescribes courses of action. The result is a descriptive model of a real‐world 
practice of justification that can be evaluated by our adequacy conditions and compared with the 
practices other people are using or that philosophers have modeled. Using our adequacy conditions, we 
assess each practice in order to discern which, if any, is likely to yield morally justified claims in each 
case. We try to explain why certain practices are exemplary in each case and why others work less well 
to justify moral claims in each situation. From these explanations, across a range of cases, we develop 
prescriptive guidelines for when certain practices should be used in certain contexts, and how they 
should be used in those contexts. The guidelines are ways of linking exemplary practices with their 
context of use. In order to investigate case studies, philosophers need to know how to select cases, how 
to specify which features of cases to study, how to evaluate cases, and what to do with the results of 
these assessments. In what follows we describe in more detail the case study method we recommend as 
we use it, illustrating its general components. 
3.1. How to Select Cases 
First, our selection of cases is guided by our understanding of what moral justification is as well as gaps 
we have perceived in philosophical study of moral justification up to this point. Our selection of cases is 
broad because we select cases that include reasoning practices that have been either ignored or 
denigrated by previous philosophers, but it is narrowed by our philosophical account of moral 
justification as a norm‐governed practice of exchanging reasons. As regards breadth, our inclusiveness is 
not random or whimsical but linked with the explicit theoretical goals we are trying to achieve. We tend 
toward inclusiveness so as to minimize prejudging what may count as moral reasoning. In the case of 
morality, we regard everyone (almost) as a full‐fledged moral agent. If the moral thinking of ordinary 
people were to be ruled out, this would result in a kind of moral elitism and authoritarianism on the part 
of philosophers. So we select cases that examine the moral reasoning of people whom contemporary 
philosophers have tended to exclude, people whose reasoning strategies may be unfamiliar to 
philosophers or have been denigrated as logical fallacies or as folklore or superstition. Our rationale for 
tending toward inclusiveness is linked with our adequacy conditions, which express the conviction that 
to be minimally acceptable as candidates for facilitating moral justification, a reasoning practice must be 
capable of addressing the concerns of those who are most vulnerable in a particular situation and must 
not too easily rationalize the moral perspectives of those with the most power in that situation. As 
regards narrowness, this inclusiveness is reined in by our conception of moral justification as involving 
exchange of reasons, which rules out such practices as reading the runes or reporting visits from the 
archangels.  
Philosophers can further narrow their selection of cases on the basis of what specific question or set of 
questions they are trying to answer. In our case, we want to understand which practices of moral 
justification are likely to work best for rationally resolving moral disputes where people are culturally 
diverse and/or socially unequal. Diversity and inequality are endemic to the world as we know it, and to 
most situations of intransigent moral disagreement. For this reason we think they should be at the 
center of philosophical accounts of moral justification, but moral philosophers up to this point have 
placed them at the periphery, as a problem of application. We place them at the center by selecting 
cases of moral disagreement in which people have diverse cultural perspectives and/or stand to one 
another in relations of social power and vulnerability.  
Philosophers must further narrow the range of cases they will study under their broad research 
objectives, for there are likely to be indefinitely many cases that might fit with these broad goals. For 
example, there are many kinds of diversity and inequality manifest in different contexts and at different 
periods in history. So just selecting cases of moral dispute marked by diversity and inequality is still too 
broad. Our goal is not to establish the new, best, single reasoning practice that will be usable to justify 
moral claims in all situations, or even in all situations of diversity and inequality, but we do want to 
develop results that are useful for addressing more than one instance of inequality and more than one 
dimension of diversity. So we select cases that highlight varying types of diversity and inequality, 
manifest in different arrangements that are still fairly contemporary. 
In our own work, we focus specifically on cultural and religious diversity and on power/vulnerability 
relations linked with gender and global location. Our rationale for focusing on these features of cases is 
linked with our adequacy conditions and especially our concern to be more inclusive than philosophers 
have been, but we fully recognize that there are other dimensions of diversity (e.g., political diversity, 
ethnicity, spiritual [nonreligious] traditions) as well as many other types of social power/vulnerability 
relations (e.g., class, disability, sexuality, race) that the case studies we investigate do not foreground 
but that certainly need to be studied. In this article we share a case study of a moral dispute across two 
communities that are divided by fairly significant cultural differences but linked through a history of 
colonization. 
Our work focuses on disputes from the twentieth and twenty‐first centuries. It is highly likely that the 
epistemic character of moral reasoning has changed with historical shifts that have radically altered the 
local and global order. We select cases that highlight what we think are particularly salient relations of 
diversity and inequality in recent history that have been forged through experiences of colonization, 
democratization, and contemporary globalization so that our guidelines are applicable to occasions of 
moral justification in the contemporary world. Historical details reaching farther back in time may turn 
out to be relevant to the analysis of cases, but we fix selection of cases by the time frame of the dispute 
and we focus on contemporary disputes. For example, the case study we share in this article examines a 
contemporary disagreement over how to morally evaluate practices of female genital cutting among the 
Maasai.  
The central point is that we select cases representing different arrangements of inequality and diversity 
within a limited, recent historical window so that our results are plausibly applicable for contemporary 
moral conflicts of this kind and have traction in more than one type of case. We select cases where 
there are attempts at moral justification, but we broaden our understanding of morality to include more 
than previous philosophers have included. We narrow our focus further by selecting cases of moral 
dispute over socially pertinent issues where parties to the dispute are diverse and/or socially unequal. 
We narrow it further still by specifying which types of diversity and inequality, manifest in which types 
of arrangements, in which historical time period. 
Finally, there is often an element of chance or serendipity in how cases are selected. In our work we 
select cases from moral disputes we happened to be somewhat familiar with already, either because 
they were taking place in communities to which we belong or because they were topics in the media 
and in scholarly debates at the time that were relevant to our current research and teaching 
opportunities. For example, female genital cutting received extensive attention from the media and 
from human rights organizations in the last two decades of the twentieth century. 
3.2. Describing, Analyzing, and Evaluating Practices of Moral Justification in Each 
Case 
Once cases are selected, analyzing and evaluating the practices of moral justification that they exemplify 
can be divided into five tasks. These are not presented, nor meant to be undertaken, in linear order but 
are interrelated components of the descriptive, evaluative, and explanatory tasks involved in 
investigating a case study of moral justification for normative moral epistemology. The five tasks are:  
(1) Identify an instance of a moral dispute where there is an attempt at moral justification. On each 
“side” of the dispute, people are entering a moral claim and giving reasons in support of the claim.  
(2) Specify the practice of moral justification that each instance exemplifies. Each instance we observe is 
an instance of a social practice of moral justification, which is a norm‐governed exchange of reasons 
aimed at moral knowledge. We try to specify the practice as it is being performed in the instance we 
have observed by identifying the norms governing that process and the assumptions on which it rests.  
(3) Analyze each practice by describing how it delineates the moral domain, characterizes agency, 
specifies reasoning methods and combines them into a strategy, and prescribes action. The result is a 
descriptive model of a specific practice of moral justification that can be evaluated using our adequacy 
conditions. Our categories for analyzing real‐world practices of moral justification in each case are the 
same categories we use to analyze practices of justification developed by philosophers. We use these 
same categories in order to be able to compare real‐world practices of justification with those practices 
defended by philosophers and to evaluate them on the basis of the same adequacy conditions. That is, 
these categories provide a way of organizing different practices of moral justification into a common 
rubric for comparison and evaluation.  
(4) Evaluate each practice as analyzed. Our adequacy conditions are designed to assess the fit between a 
practice of moral justification and the context in which it is used, to see which practices are exemplary, 
which are less capable of yielding moral knowledge in which situations, and why.  
(5) Explain why certain practices appear to be a better fit than others. What is it about the context that 
makes a certain practice of moral justification a good fit, or not, for that context?  
3.3. Generalizations Across Cases 
In studying each case, we want to understand the relationships between better and worse practices of 
moral justification that people are using and the situations in which they are using them. Our broader 
research goal, however, requires providing more than an array of interesting case studies illustrating a 
range of successful or unsuccessful moral reasoning practices. Recall that the mission we propose for 
moral epistemology is to develop guidelines for selecting practices of justification appropriate for 
contexts characterized by cultural and religious diversity and/or pervasive social inequality. Through our 
best efforts at understanding the relationship between better and worse reasoning practices and the 
features of the contexts in which they are more successful or less successful, we hope to discover 
regularities that can be the basis for developing these general normative guidelines.1 
In order to achieve this mission, beginning from a series of case studies, philosophers identify any 
regularities across cases in order to understand what, if anything, exemplary practices have in common. 
That is, although the exemplary practices of justification differ across cases (there is a plurality of good 
practices), we investigate what, if any, features these practices share that make them good fits for 
situations marked by the kinds of diversity and inequality we study. For example, our larger project 
highlights three exemplary practices that have been used in three real‐world situations marked by three 
different arrangements of diversity and inequality. We attempt to discern what all three practices have 
in common that makes them well suited for these types of contexts. These common features are 
suggestive for helping us understand how to select reasoning practices for these types of situations and 
how to use them well, and so provide a basis for formulating guidelines. 
In the remainder of the article we present one of our case studies in order to illustrate the method of 
naturalizing that we recommend for moral epistemology. This case study examines a dispute over the 
moral status of female genital cutting (FGC) as practiced among the Maasai of Kenya and Tanzania. In 
the next section, we situate the dispute, introduce the disputants, and specify the practice of moral 
justification each “side” is using in this case. In section 5, we analyze each practice through the 
categories of domain, agency, reasoning strategies, and outcome, and using our adequacy conditions we 
evaluate the use of each practice in this situation. We explain why we think that one practice is more 
successful, that is, more morally rational, than the other in this case although both practices have some 
weaknesses. We conclude by explaining how, from a series of case studies like this one, philosophers 
may develop guidelines for selecting justificatory practices appropriate for particular types of social 
contexts. 
4. A Case Study: Moral Reasoning About FGC Among the Maasai 
4.1. Situating the Moral Dispute and Introducing the Disputants 
The Maasai live primarily in the Rift Valley region spanning present‐day Kenya and Tanzania.2 Maasai 
“circumcise” both male and female children around puberty and practice what the World Health 
Organization calls types I and II circumcision of females in a ceremony that is conducted exclusively by 
elder women. Both male and female rituals mark gendered social transitions. 3 For females, FGC signifies 
a transition from being a girl child to becoming a Maasai woman, which is a new social role with new 
responsibilities.4 Becoming a Maasai woman makes one marriageable within the community, and being 
married is a socially necessary condition for being able to build and “own” one's own house within a 
homestead. Today practices of FGC are illegal in both Kenya and Tanzania where Maasai live, but Maasai 
are reportedly very resistant to eradication efforts.  
Over the past three decades, eradicating FGC has been a high priority on the moral agenda of many 
women's human rights and development organizations. These organizations argue that FGC is morally 
wrong and that the international community has a moral responsibility to support, or even spearhead, 
eradication efforts. We call this influential line of thinking the Women's Human Rights Approach (WHR). 
WHR has come under criticism from some scholars and activists who study and work in communities 
where FGC is practiced.5 Their shared line of critique is that WHR generates misleading, and even 
morally mistaken, conclusions about why these practices are wrong, who is responsible for the harm, 
and how to address the harm. These critics offer an alternative moral evaluation of FGC that relies on a 
different justificatory practice.  
This case study examines the two practices of moral justification used in these two contrasting 
evaluations of FGC.6 Both “sides” of this dispute use human rights as moral standards to evaluate FGC 
among the Maasai. However, each uses a distinct practice of moral justification in which human rights 
function very differently, generating dissimilar results. The disagreement between the two “sides” of 
this dispute does not refer to public debate in a single forum with two self‐consciously identified 
opposing viewpoints. Instead, we identify two lines of moral argumentation that have emerged in the 
global controversy over the moral status of practices of FGC, and we develop a case study that looks at 
one instantiation of this debate as it has played out in disputes over FGC among the Maasai.7 In the 
remainder of this section, we specify the practice of justification each “side” is using. In section 5, we 
analyze and evaluate each practice as it is used in this case.  
4.2. Evaluating Maasai FGC by Appealing to Women's Human Rights 
For the past four decades there has been a global movement to reconceptualize human rights so as to 
include the often neglected gender‐specific rights of women.8 Early rights documents, including the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations 1948), protected individuals against abuse in the 
public realm of employment and citizenship and from state interference in private affairs, yet they 
ignored many of the most egregious moral violations against women, which occurred within the so‐
called private realm of family, religion, and culture. On the early human rights paradigm, many 
systematic violations against women were defined outside the scope of rights and construed as matters 
of cultural or religious practice.9 
The Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in 1995,10 addressed this issue directly by 
bringing culture and religion under critical moral scrutiny. This conference produced a document called 
The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, which expands the list of universal rights by offering a 
gender‐specific interpretation of human rights and identifying many social practices that violate these 
rights, including FGC, which it tendentiously calls FG “Mutilation.”11 Here is what The Beijing Platform 
says about what it calls FGM: FGM is an act of violence against women that violates their human rights 
(United Nations 1995, article 113). Violence against women is “any form of gender‐based violence that 
results in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, or psychological harm” (article 113). Violence against 
women is “a manifestation of the historically unequal power relations between men and women, which 
have led to domination over and discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of 
women's full advancement” (article 118). These historically unequal power relations between men and 
women derive “essentially from cultural patterns, in particular the harmful effects of certain traditional 
or customary practices” (article 118). The Beijing Platform recommends that governments “prohibit 
female genital mutilation wherever it exists and give vigorous support to efforts among non‐
governmental and community organizations and religious institutions to eliminate such practices” 
(article 232).  
The World Health Organization and other U.N. organizations use the gender‐specific interpretation of 
human rights (WHR) articulated in The Beijing Platform to argue that FGC violates the rights of the child 
and of women “to health, security and physical integrity, and to be free from torture and cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment.”12 The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has issued at 
least one report that focuses specifically on Maasai communities (United Nations 2012). This report 
concludes that Maasai practices of FGC constitute a practice of systematic violence against women that 
is the result of historical relations of male domination and female subordination that are deeply rooted 
in Maasai culture. This line of argument is bolstered with accounts of Maasai men and women defending 
FGC on grounds of respect for culture, which are then used to reinforce the belief that these gender‐
specific wrongs have cultural roots (United Nations 2012).13 The report concludes with the following:  
It is the adherence to their own traditions that makes eradication of FGM among the Maasai 
such an uphill task for those seeking to end the practice. … Nevertheless, the outside world is 
slowly influencing the Maasai way of life with more girls and boys being enrolled in formal 
education and learning about the risks associated with FGM. … The eradication of FGM brings 
with it the consequence of forever altering the traditions of what is one of the few remaining 
authentic African societies. … The challenge anti‐FGM campaigners face is how to change this  
one harmful aspect of Maasai tradition without tainting the authenticity, or undermining the 
richness, of their culture. (United Nations 2012) 
On WHR, the wrong is so‐called FGM, characterized as an act of violence against women; the social 
structures enabling this violence are Maasai gender relations premised on male domination and female 
subordination, which are a product of Maasai culture; and the agents enacting the violence are Maasai 
men and complicit elder Maasai women. On this way of framing the issue, it follows that attempts to 
eliminate this moral wrong must change the culture in which it is embedded. 
In order to justify their conclusions, those using WHR advocate a practice of moral justification that 
appeals to a universal moral standard. We call this practice deductive application of a universal moral 
standard (DAU). As used in this case by WHR advocates, DAU has at least five central features:  
1. DAU appeals to a single moral standard—women's human rights—that is intended to apply to a 
single phenomenon—FGC—whenever and wherever it occurs, yielding conclusions that are 
taken to be universal in scope. 
2. The moral standard to which DAU appeals is fairly settled. A standard or principle can be more 
or less abstract. For example, the principle “do no harm” is quite abstract, leaving a lot of 
interpretive room for deciding what counts as harm. By contrast, women's human rights as 
articulated in The Beijing Platform are intentionally concrete; they are designed to bring into 
focus gender‐specific wrongs in order to plug the loopholes in earlier conceptualization of 
human rights. The specificity of a women's human rights standard means that it already contains 
the core moral analysis.14 That is, it defines which social practices are morally wrong and 
provides an account of why they are wrong. This means that anyone using the standard starts 
his or her moral evaluation with a prefabricated moral frame that foregrounds gender and 
culture. When the standard is applied in particular cases, other features of the social contexts 
where practices of FGC occur recede into the background and are obscured from the outset.  
3. Relatedly, women's human rights standards have the status of basic principles. Although human 
rights are not impervious in principle to critique and revision (and although The Beijing Platform 
document itself demonstrates how they may be revised), they are taken to express fairly 
widespread, global overlapping consensus on our most reliable moral principles at this point in 
history. On DAU, “appealing” to women's human rights here means deductively applying a 
universal standard to concrete cases in order to demonstrate to doubters that particular 
instantiations of FGC violate women's human rights.  
4. It is assumed that further information about the contexts where FGC occurs, including historical 
information about the emergence and meanings of these practices, has no moral salience. For 
example, FGC as practiced among the Maasai in Kenya is very different from FGC as practiced 
among Muslims in Indonesia, but when using DAU a person enters both contexts already 
knowing that these practices are wrong, and knowing why they are wrong (that is, all instances 
of FGC reflect and reinforce culturally specific gender relations premised on male domination 
and female subordination). Contextual and historical details are used to recruit evidence 
showing how a particular practice is indeed an instance of FGC. On DAU, the person applying the 
moral standard focuses on the situation to ensure it exemplifies the standard, but not to revise 
the standard or determine its meaning. DAU recognizes that contextual and historical details 
may put one in a better position to communicate to resisters the already established true moral 
conclusions or may be used to make eradication efforts as culturally palpable as possible, but 
these details do not influence the moral analysis.  
5. WHR advocates also use the auxiliary reasoning strategy of imaginative projection to bolster 
their primary argument by inviting “us” to imagine ourselves in “their” situation of horror.15 One 
aim of imaginative projection is to encourage an empathetic response to the situation of 
victims. As used in this case, inputs to the imaginative exercise include photographs and videos 
that portray screaming young girls crying uncontrollably. These images are plucked from their 
context, leaving the imaginer a great deal of latitude to fill in the details.  
4.3. Evaluating Maasai FGC Through the Frame of Colonial History 
Although a WHR approach to FGC is widely accepted, some scholars and activists criticize this 
argumentative strategy. The critics to whom we refer do not dispute that many practices of FGC are in 
some sense harmful, nor do they reject women's human rights as important moral tools (Nnaemeka 
2005; Nnaemeka and Ezeilo 2005; Abusharaf 2006). Rather, they object to the strategies of moral 
reasoning used by WHR advocates in their use of human rights, and the way WHR advocates frame the 
issue and characterize moral agency in evaluating FGC. Taken collectively, the work of these critics offers 
a sustained argument that WHR systematically conceals features of the social and historical contexts in 
which FGC occurs that are highly relevant for an adequate moral evaluation of these practices. In this 
section, we present one version of this criticism and an alternative moral analysis of FGC among the 
Maasai through the frame of colonial history. We call this a postcolonial analysis approach (PCA).  
As mentioned in the introduction to this case, Maasai FGC initiates the social transition of a girl into 
womanhood. In the period prior to formal colonization in 1921,16 social responsibilities associated with 
Maasai womanhood included a significant amount of economic and political authority. Though a 
married elder male enjoyed political authority over general homestead management, each wife within a 
homestead built and controlled access to her house (Talle 1998, 133). Anthropologist Aud Talle 
describes house occupancy as the base of female social agency within Maasai communities (1998, 133). 
For example, Maasai wives had authority to initiate and testify at judicial proceedings, and they 
participated in dispute resolution both within and between homesteads (Hodgson 1999, 48). Maasai 
wives controlled the production and distribution of milk, which is a primary food staple for the Maasai; 
they had to be consulted in decisions about whether to slaughter, trade, or give away an animal; and 
they were the primary economic agents in a barter economy, traveling to markets outside the 
homestead in order to barter surplus milk and hides in exchange for other important goods (48).  
Talle's research shows that the cultural logic of Maasai life has long linked FGC with economic and 
political roles for women because only married women could assume these roles and only “circumcised” 
women could marry. Anthropologist Dorothy Hodgson notes, however, that in precolonial times Maasai 
gender relations were neither dualistic nor hierarchical but based on notions of complementarity and 
interdependence. While it was always possible to distinguish between a domestic sphere of home and 
homestead and a public space outside the homestead, both males and females occupied important 
social roles in both domestic and public space (Hodgson 1999, 58; Hodgson 2001). Hodgson argues that 
the term “patriarchy” does not accurately describe the nature of Maasai gender relations prior to 
colonization because, despite the rigidly defined gender roles for both males and females, social 
relations between the sexes were not premised on principles of male domination and female 
subordination.  
Maasai gender relations shifted dramatically, however, during and after formal colonization by the 
British (c. 1920–1961). As Hodgson describes it, British authorities mapped a culturally specific gender 
ideology onto their perceptions of and interventions into Maasai life, creating “the male domains of 
public and political in opposition and superior to the female domains of private and domestic” (1999, 
57). 
There were at least three colonial policies that significantly altered Maasai gender relations. First, the 
policy of indirect rule required identifying a central Maasai authority to act as an intermediary between 
the Maasai and the British. In implementing this policy, British authorities assumed that male elders 
were already “the” political leaders, thereby extending the authority of select male elders over both 
junior men and women, strengthening and consolidating their power. By creating a centralized male 
political authority, indirect rule undermined whatever political power Maasai women may have 
previously enjoyed (Hodgson 1999, 53–55). Second, needing to create a cash economy in order to 
produce tax revenue for the Crown, the British also transformed a previously female‐based barter 
economy into a newly male‐dominated cash economy. Livestock was now to be bought and sold on the 
market for cash, and colonial authorities assumed that males were the “owners” of cattle. So Maasai 
men were integrated into the new economy as buyers and sellers of livestock, while Maasai women 
were dispossessed of their previously shared cattle rights and now struggled to gain access to cash 
“indirectly through gifts from men or the sale of cattle by their sons or husbands” (57). The third policy, 
which followed directly from the second, was to implement a new system of taxation. This system 
designated male elders as “tax payers” and “heads of household,” who were now required to pay a 
“plural wives” tax for “dependent” women living on their homestead (58).  
On the surface, these policies appeared gender‐neutral, but they reflected a British gender ideology that 
was deeply patriarchal. The combined effect of these colonial policies was severe political and economic 
disempowerment and symbolic devaluation of Maasai women. Foregrounding colonial history reveals 
that contemporary Maasai gender relations, which today are identified as “authentically” and deeply 
embedded in Maasai culture, are really a “co‐invention” by British colonial authorities and opportunistic 
Maasai in a fairly recent struggle for power.17 
The postcolonial analysis (PCA) of Maasai FGC suggests an alternative moral analysis. Contrary to the 
WHR conclusion, PCA does not portray Maasai FGC as a violent manifestation of the historically unequal 
power relations between Maasai men and women rooted in inherently patriarchal Maasai cultural 
patterns. This analysis keeps the idea that the wrong committed is practices of violence against women, 
and also the idea that the social structures enabling this form of violence include gender relations 
premised on male domination and female subordination. However, on PCA, the gender relations 
enabling and maintaining this form of violence result in part from the historical experience of European 
colonization of Kenya and Tanzania, and so the agents enacting this violence are a complex cast of 
characters, including British colonizers who imposed a distinctively British patriarchal gender ideology 
on Maasai through a variety of colonial interventions. 
WHR contends that the harmful gender relations supporting Maasai FGC derive from cultural patterns 
that belong essentially to the Maasai, but PCA argues that this claim is false. Some physical harms or 
risks associated with Maasai FGC have likely always been present, but PCA suggests that the practice 
does not become a manifestation of patriarchal violence against women until the colonial encounter, or 
rather that it becomes a tool of male dominance only in the context of this encounter. The harmful 
gender relations that today give symbolic meaning to Maasai FGC derive from cultural patterns, but the 
cultural patterns from which they derive resulted from a forced blending of British gender ideology with 
preexisting Maasai social categories.  
An alternative practice of moral justification supports PCA, although advocates of this approach do not 
explicitly defend this practice. PCA relies on a practice of moral justification that we call empirically 
informed reflective equilibrium (EIRE). EIRE, as used in this case, recommends using women's human 
rights as a universal moral standard that flags morally suspicious gendered practices but interprets the 
moral standard in light of a particular social and historical context in order to discern whether there is a 
moral violation in this case, and if so, to generate a comprehensive account of that violation. As used in 
this case, EIRE has at least five features that distinguish it from DAU used by WHR advocates.  
1. On EIRE, moral evaluation of FGC does not start with a single universal moral standard of human 
rights that already tells us FGC, as a singular phenomenon, is wrong. Instead, EIRE begins with 
contextual scrutiny of FGC in a particular situation and assumes that there is no culturally 
neutral description of FGC. Even if physical descriptions of these practices may be similar, their 
symbolic and cultural meanings vary widely. The “it” being described is not assimilated to 
practices all over the world. Instead, different cases and their meanings have to be studied in 
context, which means that EIRE will yield conclusions that are narrow rather than universal in 
scope. For example, in this case conclusions could only be reached about Maasai FGC. As a 
practice of reflective equilibrium, EIRE also begins with multiple inputs, including women's 
human rights, colonial history, and Maasai cultural understandings about FGC. 
2. EIRE accepts the status of women's human rights as important moral principles, which in this 
case are designed to pick out social practices that manifest violence against women. EIRE 
notices, however, that despite the attempts to formulate women's human rights in ways that 
allow little room for interpretation, there are always borderline cases where genital 
interventions may or may not be argued to be violent (e.g., some symbolic genital nicking). EIRE 
also notices that cultures are not self‐contained, readily identifiable entities, and that there is 
also not a culturally neutral interpretation of women's human rights. 
3. EIRE takes human rights as moral standards that need interpreting in light of particular cases 
rather than just implemented in a deductive manner. Recall that on the WHR model, which uses 
DAU, contextual details of particular cases do not influence the moral analysis, because the 
moral analysis is already given in the standard. By contrast, on PCA, which uses EIRE, contextual 
details have salience in shaping our moral assessment of the situation and our interpretation of 
women's human rights and not just in persuading doubters or tailoring eradication efforts. In 
this case, through reasoning by EIRE, advocates of PCA use historical details to reveal a more 
comprehensive account of the human rights abuses Maasai women have suffered, which 
include the abuses they experienced in the colonial period.18  
4. Relatedly, EIRE uses women's human rights as one important source of moral knowledge but 
appeals to other sources of knowledge—including, in this case, history, gender studies, 
postcolonial studies, and anthropology—in order to interpret human rights in light of social and 
cultural contexts, thereby making the reflective equilibrium wide rather than narrow. 
5. Finally, imagination is also used in reasoning by EIRE. The imaginative inputs available through 
EIRE include a rich historical and cultural picture of a particular practice as performed by a 
specific group of people, which leaves the imaginer with less latitude to fill in details. 
5. Assessing the Alternative Practices of Moral Justification Used in This 
Case 
The practice of moral justification used by WHR is deductive application of a universal moral standard 
(DAU), and the practice used by PCA is empirically informed reflective equilibrium (EIRE). Both practices 
use women's human rights as moral standards to evaluate practices of FGC among the Maasai, but the 
two practices use human rights quite differently. In this section we analyze each practice as used in this 
case through the categories of moral domain, moral agency, reasoning strategies, and outcome, and we 
evaluate each practice using the adequacy conditions we have previously defended. 
5.1. Delineating the Moral Domain 
Any practice of moral justification will include some way of framing moral issues that determines which 
issues fall within the scope of morality and how issues that fall within the frame are characterized. Those 
using DAU frame FGC as a contemporary violation of a universal human right. DAU diagnoses the 
violation using a single undifferentiated category of “FG Mutilation,” which is defined as a specifically 
gendered practice in a named but otherwise nonspecific local culture, operating in an unexamined 
global context. By contrast, advocates of EIRE focus on the specific practice of FGC within the particular 
ethnic group of the Maasai and analyze this practice in the historical context of European colonization of 
Kenya and Tanzania in order to discern whether there is a rights violation in this case, and if so, to 
interpret the violation(s) in light of these details. 
Each way of framing the issue is simultaneously wider and narrower than the other. The DAU frame is 
broader because, in evaluating this case, it relies on a broad understanding of FGC which it calls FGM, 
and treats all practices everywhere as morally equivalent. Yet it is also narrower than the EIRE frame 
because it is preset to foreground gender and culture to the exclusion of geography and history. By 
contrast, the EIRE frame is narrower than the DAU frame insofar as it resists using a comprehensive 
category of FGC and instead focuses exclusively on the practice as it occurs among Maasai. Yet, it is also 
broader and more flexible than the DAU frame insofar as it does not preset the categories of moral 
evaluation. Instead, it allows salient categories of moral assessment to emerge through empirical 
inquiry. In this example, those using EIRE place Maasai FGC in the context of more than a century of 
colonial history. Each delineation of the moral domain highlights and obscures different aspects of the 
practice of FGC among the Maasai and uses these to justify different moral conclusions. 
In this case, we think that the frame employed by those relying on EIRE is a more morally rational way to 
view the moral domain because this frame makes visible several features of the situation that are 
morally relevant but are hidden by the DAU framing. Specifically, those employing EIRE are able to show 
how the social meaning of FGC for the Maasai today has been partially shaped by their experience of 
colonization, a feature the DAU frame obscures. The moral analysis supported by EIRE is also able to 
show how disregard of colonial history by using the DAU frame conceals the abuse of global power. 
Portraying FGC among the Maasai simply as an abusive violation of human rights perpetrated on 
indigenous women and girls by indigenous men and complicit elder women not only oversimplifies the 
practice, it also disproportionately brings under moral scrutiny the lives of those with the least global 
power while simultaneously protecting from moral scrutiny the behavior of those with more global 
power who have also played a role in this issue.19 
 
Finally, by using a moral frame that foregrounds culture to the exclusion of history and presumes 
cultures to be self‐contained easily identifiable entities, DAU has rationalized eradication efforts 
premised exclusively on cultural intervention. The colonial experience was already a devastating 
encounter of violently imposed cultural change. So the DAU frame too easily legitimates potentially 
harmful and infeasible interventions by people who already have a history of power abuse in this region. 
By contrast, those using EIRE have the methodological resources to show that this understanding of 
culture is flawed. Moreover, EIRE encourages moral analysts to be flexible in their framing and to 
consider a wide range of empirical information pertinent to the particular situation under scrutiny when 
delineating the moral domain. 
5.2. Characterizing Moral Agents 
The way each practice defines the moral domain shapes the ways in which moral agents are 
characterized, including those harmed and how they are represented, those who have moral 
responsibility for the harm, and those who are authorized to evaluate the harm. 
How are the victims identified and represented on each approach? By framing FGC exclusively in terms 
of gender and culture, DAU users take for granted that those wronged are the women who undergo the 
practice. The women's perspective is assumed through imaginative projection, and they are taken to be 
exclusively victims rather than agents. DAU does not enable the voices of Maasai women to be heard, or 
they are quoted from out‐of‐context interviews where they are cited as defending FGC on cultural 
grounds. These quotes get recruited as evidence to show that Maasai women are prisoners of either 
false consciousness or moral backwardness. 
By contrast, the broader frame of colonial history enables those using EIRE to notice that all Maasai, 
men and women, have been harmed by the imposition of British gender ideology onto Maasai social life 
while simultaneously allowing them to explain why and how Maasai women have suffered gender‐
specific injury. Those using EIRE in this case do not say much beyond this about the women who 
undergo FGC, nor do they include their voices, which is a significant limitation of the way this practice is 
used in this case. EIRE does, however, leave open the possibility of perceiving that Maasai women might 
“choose” the practice in some sense and that they are not necessarily always being dragged kicking and 
screaming. Moreover, those using EIRE can incorporate historical facts that may suggest an 
interpretation of contemporary Maasai resistance to eradication projects as expressing moral agency 
rather than as necessarily revealing false consciousness or moral backwardness. For example, EIRE 
enables its users to notice the moral relevance of a 1950s Kenyan movement, in which Maasai 
participated, called “I Will Circumcise Myself,” whereby young girls performed genital cuttings on 
themselves in order to defy the legal ban imposed by British colonial authorities (Thomas 1996). EIRE 
enables its users to consider the possibility that Maasai resistance to contemporary eradication efforts 
reflects suspicion about foreign‐led interventions premised on cultural change by people from global 
powers who have a morally poor track record in this region. By contrast, DAU makes it very difficult to 
consider this possibility and instead encourages viewing Maasai women as mere objects of moral 
concern. So despite its limitations as used in this case, EIRE makes it possible for its users to take a more 
nuanced perspective on moral agency than DAU does because EIRE encourages the seeking of empirical 
evidence that is morally relevant to the victimhood or agency of Maasai women.  
Who is assigned moral culpability on each strategy? DAU encourages its users to blame people who 
currently promote this FGC practice, either directly or indirectly, whereas EIRE enables consideration of 
the culpability of a much broader range of candidates, including British colonizers who are now dead. 
Those using the DAU frame identify members of the Maasai community exclusively as defendants and 
also as the only defendants in this case. People located in the global north are methodologically 
excluded as having no direct involvement with the practice, a distance that suggests that their proper 
roles in its moral evaluation are those of prosecutor and impartial moral judge. By contrast, EIRE allows 
its users to position people located in the global north as possible parties to the harm and so as 
defendants in this case, thereby suggesting that the Maasai are not the only defendants. And as just 
described, EIRE also enables repositioning all Maasai, men and women, as legitimate plaintiffs in a more 
complex case of human rights abuse, which includes the abuse of colonization, thereby suggesting that 
Maasai are not exclusively defendants. 
Who is likely to be assigned moral standing to evaluate the harm on each approach? With DAU, human 
rights are taken as universal standards of moral evaluation that apply to everyone everywhere in the 
world and in whose maintenance everyone has a stake simply by virtue of being human. As with all 
human rights problems, the state is primarily responsible to address the harm, and indeed Kenya 
recently outlawed all participation in FGC in any way (Boseley 2011). However, DAU does not preclude 
assuming that everyone everywhere has at least a prima facie claim to participate equally in evaluating 
human rights abuses, an assumption that opens the possibility of legitimating NGO interventions and 
perhaps even state support for religious organizations seeking to intervene. Although EIRE does not 
preclude assuming that people everywhere have a stake in eliminating rights violations, this justificatory 
practice does not require assuming that everyone's stake in every case is the same. In this example, by 
focusing more narrowly on Maasai FGC, this approach implicitly identifies central protagonists, including 
Maasai men, Maasai women, British colonial authorities, contemporary governments attempting to 
outlaw FGC, and development organizations promoting eradication efforts in Maasai communities. It 
simultaneously places others as peripheral stakeholders in this case, including people living in other 
communities where FGC is practiced, such as Muslims in Indonesia, as well as people in parts of the 
world whose connection with Maasai and their recent history is remote or nonexistent.  
We think that in the particular case of FGC among the Maasai, EIRE enables a more acute assessment of 
moral agency, including moral standing and responsibility, than DAU allows. EIRE permits consideration 
of the possibility that DAU may enable the abuse of social power insofar as positioning the north as the 
external moral critic unfairly makes people in this global location judge and jury of their own case. EIRE 
also makes it possible for users to consider that Maasai opposition to eradication efforts may not be 
matters of moral backwardness, ignorance, or false consciousness but instead may reflect reasonable 
skepticism about interventions promoting cultural change. Finally, EIRE allows for a more variegated and 
fairer picture of who has legitimate standing to evaluate the harm. 
5.3. Strategies of Moral Reasoning 
In DAU argumentation, top‐down inferences run in one direction from general to particular. The 
argument is bare of details; most contextual factors are taken not to be morally salient, and might even 
be distracting.20 DAU bolsters argumentation through a form of imaginative projection.  
By contrast, EIRE involves reasoning by reflective analysis of particular cases in light of universal 
standards and reinterpretation of universal standards in light of particular cases. EIRE also permits 
seeking out the perspective of those who have the most at stake in the issue under scrutiny and who are 
the most epistemically disadvantaged. Those using the EIRE argumentative strategy seek reflective 
equilibrium among various descriptions of “the” problem, various accounts of the salience and 
interpretation of proposed moral standards, and a variety of contextual factors, including historical and 
power dimensions. A “horizontal” web of inferences runs among these. 
In this case, our success criteria favor the reasoning recommended by EIRE as more rational than the 
reasoning recommended by DAU. EIRE's flexibility and relative openness to new interpretations makes it 
less likely than DAU to enable legitimation of power abuse and more likely to generate reasoning that is 
plausible, is usable, and yields feasible conclusions. Human rights are a powerful and important moral 
tool, but in this case they cannot function as the only moral tool. Moreover, they cannot be used 
rationally in this type of context without recognizing that the meaning of human rights standards must 
be interpreted in each case, not just preformed or implemented; furthermore, the interpretations must 
be plausible to those whose lives stand to be most disrupted, so that the conclusions have normative 
force and are feasible for them. In some contexts, deductive application of a universal moral standard 
might be morally rational and might yield credible moral conclusions. Using EIRE, however, we can see 
that the use of the DAU reasoning in the case of the Maasai allows for a corrupt moral analysis of FGC, 
and that the reasoning strategy of DAU is itself corrupt in this case.  
Moreover, EIRE also uses the imagination to encourage empathetic response, but it avoids 
sensationalizing and “othering” the “exotic” and “savage” social practices of “darkest Africa.” EIRE 
provides a more accurate cultural and historical picture of FGC among the Maasai, leaving the imaginer 
with less latitude to fill in the details and directing the imaginer to cultivate a more accurate empathetic 
response, which includes a more informed understanding of the practice as it occurs in this community, 
a more complete picture of who has been involved in establishing the salience of the practice today, and 
self‐knowledge about why Maasai might receive proposed interventions from members of Western 
nations with suspicion. By contrast, the imaginative inputs available on DAU are decontextualized 
photographs and video clips. The imaginer fills in the details, which makes it too easy to rely on 
stereotypical information about unfamiliar peoples in “exotic” faraway places, and thereby too easy to 
generate an inaccurate empathetic response that enables power abuse. 
For all of these reasons, we argue that EIRE is capable of delivering a more comprehensive account of 
the moral harm, a fairer account of who is responsible for the harm, and a more morally defensible basis 
for decisions about whether to intervene, and if so who should intervene, and how. 
5.4. Courses of Action Prescribed 
Those who reason according to WHR prescribe state intervention to prohibit practices of FGC and 
recommend institutional support to NGOs and religious organizations on grounds of humanitarian 
intervention. The courses of action they prescribe advocate cultural change, although they puzzlingly 
require that somehow intervening agencies must change just a single aspect of Maasai culture without 
damaging the supposed authenticity or richness of Maasai traditions. In this case, those using EIRE do 
not prescribe a determinate course of action for Maasai, which is a limitation of the way the practice is 
used in this case. However, EIRE's requirement of attention to the role of contextual details in moral 
analyses means that this approach encourages users to prescribe responses on a case-by-case basis, and 
in addition leaves open the possibility that in some cases a response may not be warranted. And when a 
response is warranted, the reasoning strategy of EIRE is more likely to yield a course of action tailored 
appropriately to the material and existential realities of the people who have the most at stake in the 
issue. Using EIRE, they are more likely to attend to historical and present power relations between those 
proposing a course of action and those to whom they make such a proposal. For example, those using 
EIRE might prescribe something like symbolic genital nicking or circumcision-with-words ceremonies, 
which have emerged in other communities with similar histories. These responses are designed to 
mitigate the long-term health consequences and social harms associated with these practices, while 
preserving elements of their cultural and social significance. So although DAU delivers a determinate 
conclusion in this case, our success criteria suggest that those using EIRE are more likely than those 
using DAU to reach moral conclusions that are less susceptible to power abuse and more feasible for 
those most directly affected. 
5.5. Summing Up Our Assessment of These Practices of Moral Justification 
We conclude this section by drawing explicitly on our four assessment conditions to summarize our 
evaluation of DAU and EIRE as practices of moral justification in this case. Although there may be other 
situations in which DAU works well, we conclude that DAU is a less fitting practice of moral justification 
than EIRE is in this particular case. 
Plausibility. DAU and EIRE both appeal to human rights, but in our view EIRE enables a more plausible 
way of using human rights as tools of moral assessment than DAU does in this case. DAU assumes that 
“the” answer to “the” problem exists already in the form of a universal principle of women's human 
rights that is already formulated at the appropriate level of abstraction for application in all contexts; it 
is not too thin and not too thick. By contrast, EIRE assumes that the relevant standard or principle and 
the appropriate level of interpretation for it will emerge as the “wrong” comes into clearer focus. 
Interpreting human rights in light of the details of a particular practice of FGC in a specific place is more 
likely to be able to link the moral authority of the conclusion with the reasoning that generates that 
conclusion. Users of EIRE in this case also provide a more plausible story about the variety of rights 
violations involved in this case and a more plausible interpretation of those violations that is likely to 
seem less arbitrary or baffling to those most directly impacted.  
Usability. Usability requires that all those affected be able to participate in moral reasoning; this may 
require, for example, that participants utilize particular rituals or forms of speech. In this case, Maasai 
are not actually using either reasoning strategy, which is a significant weakness of both approaches. 
However, in our view EIRE has greater potential than DAU to better satisfy the usability condition in 
situations like this one. The DAU strategy makes no room for cultural standards or contextual details to 
interpret the meaning of rights; they are used only to tailor eradication efforts. Moreover, Maasai 
opposition to moral arguments supported by DAU reasoning suggests that the reasoning being offered is 
not plausible to many Maasai. One reason for this may be that the DAU reasoning strategy is not usable 
by them in the sense of broadly conforming to internal cultural standards. EIRE leaves open the 
possibility for Maasai standards of justification to be used because the reasoning strategy of EIRE 
encourages its users to continually seek out new information from the particular social context under 
scrutiny, and so it can incorporate Maasai moral perspectives in order to interpret, revise, or broaden 
human rights principles.  
Abuse of power or vulnerability. In our view, DAU is more vulnerable to abuse of power and vulnerability 
than EIRE is in this case. DAU as used in this case brings under moral scrutiny the least powerful while 
shielding the most powerful from scrutiny. DAU also makes its own moral framework appear 
incontrovertible while too easily lending itself to discrediting anyone who uses an alternative 
framework. In our assessment, DAU is more susceptible to power abuse in this context for at least three 
reasons. First, it relies on a static and oversimplified notion of culture in a context in which cultural 
interventions are not innocent but track global power relations both historically and at present. Second, 
it also tends to assign “culture” to those with the least global power while simultaneously making 
dominant global perspectives appear cultureless, which they are not. Finally, DAU foregrounds gender21 
but places gender relations in a historical vacuum, and so obscures the complex web of historical 
interactions among nations and cultures that have produced the specific gender relations within Maasai 
communities that are today the object of global moral criticism. The epistemic stance enabled by DAU is 
eerily similar to the perspective of British colonizers who perceived gender and culture in the Maasai 
practices that were exotic or foreign to them, but who failed to see their own policies as gendered and 
instead regarded them as natural and invisible. Although EIRE is certainly not immune from being 
abused, it enables corrigibility and discourages dogmatism. EIRE's insistence on seeking out empirical 
information relevant to understanding the contemporary social meaning of Maasai FGC and the 
conditions that enable its continuance, as well as EIRE's ability to incorporate Maasai perspectives, make 
this reasoning strategy less susceptible to power abuse than DAU in this situation.  
Feasibility. Maasai are reported as very resistant to eradication efforts justified using DAU, efforts that 
include state prohibition of FGC coupled with NGO and religious organization interventions that 
advocate cultural change. In our view, this resistance provides prima facie evidence that the moral 
conclusions defended by DAU are not feasible to many Maasai. The conclusions may seem arbitrary, 
baffling, or suspicious given previously devastating interventions premised on cultural change. The 
interventions might also be materially or existentially impossible for many Maasai, given the real 
limitations of their situation and the complicated links between Maasai FGC and social life. In our view, 
EIRE is likely more capable of delivering more feasible recommendations than DAU because people 
using EIRE are not committed to prejudging cases but instead are encouraged to seek out all morally 
salient information, including alternative moral perspectives. This means that EIRE-derived solutions are 
likely to be premised on more nuanced assessments of the risks and benefits of eradication efforts in 
particular situations and to find solutions that are more likely to be real possibilities for people in the 
contexts they actually live in.  
6. Conclusion 
Although in this case EIRE is a more successful reasoning model than DAU, using EIRE does not 
guarantee a correct moral analysis for all cases. The upshot of our case study is not to defend EIRE as the 
new privileged supermodel for all contexts. Certain aspects of EIRE are likely good reasoning practices in 
other contexts too, but in other contexts the most rational practice of moral justification might look very 
different. We are not defending any single procedure as the best for all contexts, or even for all contexts 
of diversity and inequality. Rather, through a series of case studies like this one, we are looking for 
regularities across cases in reasoning strategies that are more and less successful. For example, one 
regularity might be that in situations of moral controversy where people are culturally diverse and 
socially unequal, deductive application of a universal moral standard is inadequate because it proves to 
be too susceptible to misuse by those with more social power. In other types of situations where 
interlocutors share greater cultural competence and similar histories, and where the power inequalities 
are less disparate, deductive application of a universal standard might be morally rational.  
To conclude we return once more to the analogy with clinical research. There are enough physiological 
similarities among human beings to predict that similarly situated human beings will respond similarly to 
a drug protocol. Yet vast differences in cultural, political, and environmental aspects of social life situate 
people differently enough to determine the effectiveness of a drug protocol only partially, meaning that 
researchers often cannot proclaim a drug effective for all contexts. They have to study the relationship 
between a drug protocol and its context of use to see if in fact it will be effective in that context. 
Similarly, we have argued that a variety of social and cultural factors partially determine the fittingness 
of a moral reasoning practice for a particular context, meaning that the mission to discover a single 
superstrategy that can justify moral claims in any and all contexts may be a mission impossible. Instead, 
we propose that philosophers study the interaction between reasoning practices and their context of 
use in order to judge which practices are likely capable of justifying moral claims in particular types of 
contexts, and to understand why—what it is about the context that makes some reasoning practices 
effective and others ineffective or even harmful. From a series of cases, philosophers may discover 
regularities that can be the basis for developing normative guidelines for selecting reasoning practices 
likely to be appropriate for different types of situations, which is our newly stated mission for moral 
epistemology.  
Footnotes 
1 We do not take up this part of the case study method in this essay.  
2 The Maasai are pastoralists, although maintaining this seminomadic lifestyle is increasingly difficult 
because state and private “ownership” of land forces them to acknowledge nation‐state borders 
between Kenya and Tanzania. Maasai communities are organized around homesteads and are 
traditionally polygamous. Gender and age are primary categories of social organization within 
Maasai communities.  
3 Male circumcision is not as much challenged by outsiders as FGC, on grounds that male circumcision is 
not comparable in its harmful physical and sexual consequences to practices of FGC. It is at least 
arguable, however, that male circumcision does not draw moral outrage from members of 
Western nations because “we” routinely practice it, at least in the United States (much less so in 
the United Kingdom), and so it does not appear morally problematic.  
4 One Maasai woman interviewed by anthropologist Barbara Hoffman remarks that a female person 
who has not experienced FGC is still considered a girl, even if she has had ten children. See 
Hoffman 2002.  
5 These critics include scholars who have training in African history, gender studies, anthropology, and 
postcolonial studies, and activists who have worked to address a variety of women's issues, 
including FGC, in local communities. See Abusharaf 2006. See also Nnaemeka 2005. We have 
discerned a shared line of critique and alternative justificatory strategies used to evaluate FGC 
among these thinkers and activists.  
6 This case study draws from a less developed version by Tobin published elsewhere. See Tobin 2009. 
Although the basic details of the case are the same, here we use the case study to develop 
several epistemological and methodological points not made in the earlier work.  
7 Another prominent strategy of moral opposition to Maasai FGC emphasizes the health risks and 
physical and sexual harms associated with these practices. The health‐based approach has led to 
modifications in how FGC is administered to make it safer and more consensual, but this 
argument strategy does not directly attack the symbolic meanings of FGC or the cultural and 
social structures that support their continuation. Our case study focuses instead on two lines of 
moral argumentation that emphasize violence against women as the objectionable feature of 
Maasai FGC.  
8 This movement has been articulated in the United Nations' series of international conferences on 
women: World Conference of the International Women's Year (Mexico City, 1975), reports 
available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/mexico.html; World Conference of 
the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace (Copenhagan, 1980), 
reports available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/copenhagen.html; World 
Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the United Nations Decade for 
Women: Equality, Development and Peace (Nairobi, 1985), reports available at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/nairobi.html; Fourth World Conference on 
Women: Action for Equality, Development and Peace (Beijing, 1995), reports available at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/fwcwn.html. Perhaps the most prominent 
outcome of these conferences was the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), initiated by the First World Conference (1975) and 
prepared by groups within the 1976 Commission and Third Committee of the General Assembly 
from 1977 to 1979 for presentation at the Second World Conference (1980). See United Nations, 
“Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),” 
adopted by the U.N. General Assembly (1979), available at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm. Since the Four World 
Conferences, Review and Appraisal sessions have been held every five years (2000, 2005, 2010). 
Critics identified that the problem was not just discriminatory application of human rights 
standards but was rooted in a narrow and gender‐biased conceptualization of human rights, 
which covertly assumed that the bearer of rights was gendered masculine.  
9 Susan Okin discusses the example of slavery being considered a human rights violation but the 
practice of bride selling being perceived as a protected cultural practice rather than an instance 
of slavery. See Okin 2000, 29.  
10 See our footnote 8.  
11 The Beijing Platform works within a human rights framework that builds on CEDAW by giving a 
gender‐sensitive interpretation of human rights. It details several strategic objectives and 
recommendations for government action in order to implement these objectives. It is housed 
under and used by the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of 
Women (U.N. Women) and the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM).  
12 See World Health Organization 2012. The World Health Organization's “fact sheet” on FGM states 
that “FGM is recognized internationally as a violation of the human rights of girls and women,” 
reflecting “deep‐rooted inequality between the sexes constituting an extreme form of 
discrimination against women” that violates their rights. Another U.N. publication (United 
Nations 2012) explains the cultural roots of FGM in several tribal populations living in Kenya, 
and then advocates in favor of the international response, which recognizes FGM as “a violation 
of the fundamental human rights of girls and women.” In 2008, the United Nations designated 
February 8 as “International Day of Zero Tolerance of FGM.”  
13 Maasai who were asked why the spiritual and educational aspect of FGM ceremonies could not be 
isolated from the physical cutting are reported as responding with “a seemingly unchallengeable 
argument: ‘It is our tradition—we must follow our culture'” (United Nations 2005).  
14 Indeed, labeling them as “mutilation” is obviously a thick interpretation.  
15 This invitation to imagine is encouraged through appeals to emotion—for example, using morally 
charged language such as “mutilation” and provocative imagery to promote disgust, 
compassion, and anger. Sometimes media are used to assist people in this imaginative feat by 
providing videos that show these practices or reenactments of them in which young girls are 
heard screaming in pain or crying uncontrollably. See Walker and Parmar 1993. See also United 
Nations 2012, which provides links to a documentary bearing the name of the report, “Razor's 
Edge,” and uses visual and auditory means to facilitate the imaginative feat.  
16 Formal colonization was initiated in 1921, but the British began forcibly removing Maasai from their 
land c. 1904 and again in 1911.  
17 Hodgson's account does not romanticize or oversimplify the role of Maasai men in this process. 
Opportunistic Maasai took advantage of colonial policies in order to strengthen their political 
and economic power over both other lower‐status men and women (1999, 64–65). Uma 
Narayan (1997, 81–118) makes a similar point regarding disputes over the moral status of sati 
and dowry‐related deaths in India. Through careful historical analysis (in particular, through a 
frame of colonial history), Narayan shows how the practice of sati becomes an Indian “tradition” 
through struggles for power between some Indian men and British colonial authorities.  
18 One way to characterize the contrast between the two reasoning practices is that whereas DAU 
makes the picture (that is, a particular instance of FGC) fit a preset frame, EIRE tailors the frame 
to fit a picture of the practice that comes into clearer focus with attention to more contextual 
details.  
19 For example, it is at least arguable that other genital cuttings such as male circumcision deserve 
comparable moral attention, or that other issues such as “acid scarring,” where acid is thrown 
on women's faces to disfigure them for life, deserve at least equally wide‐scale global opposition 
campaigns. But these practices are prevalent in countries with greater global power than Kenya 
and Tanzania, and so it is at least arguable that they get less moral attention because the places 
where they occur are more impervious to moral scrutiny.  
20 Interestingly, the reasoning strategies used by scholars and activists to develop the women's human 
rights framework articulated in The Beijing Platform resembles empirically informed reflective 
equilibrium. Human rights were taken as important moral standards but then interpreted in 
light of the specific moral experiences of women in a variety of cultural contexts, revealing a 
need to radically reconceptualize rights in order to address women's rights violations. Yet once 
WHR had received relatively secure status as a set of internationally recognized moral 
standards, it became easy for members of more powerful global communities to revert to 
deductive application of these standards. In some circumstances this might be an appropriate 
reasoning strategy, but in general when moral disputes involve interlocutors from former 
colonial powers and contemporary global powers with histories of colonial interventions in 
those regions, deductive application of rights standards is likely to be an inadequate justificatory 
strategy because it is too susceptible to misuse by those with more global power.  
21 The WHR approach has made visible gender power abuse across cultural and national contexts, 
which had been systematically concealed by previous human rights frameworks, and to the 
extent it has done this it has been successful.  
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